Here's my guess on what the underlying political situation in Pakistan is. I've read very little, most of my knowledge coming from NPR reports over the years. That combined with having read enough political history (not specific to Pakistan) to keep Amazon and Barnes and Noble in business is all I'm going on.
There's a three-way battle for control over the country. The players are
But the zealots (including but not limited to the Taliban) are a major player in the short term because they're armed. And they're a major player in the medium-term and perhaps beyond because it's to others' advantage that they be armed and dangerous. Chief among those other is the Army.
The fundamental dynamic (if I'm right) is that the army is refusing to whole-heartedly defend the state unless it is the state. If the army staged a coup right now, civilian outrage might prompt a revolution* and destroy the traditional army altogether. But so long as the civil government is presented with a military threat to its existence, the army has great leverage. On the one hand, they can demand all sorts of things from the current government. On the other hand, if the insurgency becomes disruptive enough, the civil government may be discredited, allowing direct martial rule.
Of course while the army may think of the zealots as a cat's paw, such paws have been known to grow into independent tigers. If society becomes insecure for long enough, and if all other institutions become almost as unpopular as the zealots and are unable to keep order, then the public may acquiesce to religious rule, just as it did in Afghanistan, where the Taliban was also never popular except in comparison to abysmal alternatives. However Pakistan is much more urban than Afghanistan and I don't think we're anywhere near that outcome.
*Such a revolution is nuclear state is not something the world should be sanguine about, even if we think the long-term benefits to Pakistani society would out-weigh the short-term violence that a revolution would almost surely bring.
There's a three-way battle for control over the country. The players are
- the army (including the intelligence services), who have been in charge for most of the country's existence
- civil society, including the current elected government
- the religious zealots
But the zealots (including but not limited to the Taliban) are a major player in the short term because they're armed. And they're a major player in the medium-term and perhaps beyond because it's to others' advantage that they be armed and dangerous. Chief among those other is the Army.
The fundamental dynamic (if I'm right) is that the army is refusing to whole-heartedly defend the state unless it is the state. If the army staged a coup right now, civilian outrage might prompt a revolution* and destroy the traditional army altogether. But so long as the civil government is presented with a military threat to its existence, the army has great leverage. On the one hand, they can demand all sorts of things from the current government. On the other hand, if the insurgency becomes disruptive enough, the civil government may be discredited, allowing direct martial rule.
Of course while the army may think of the zealots as a cat's paw, such paws have been known to grow into independent tigers. If society becomes insecure for long enough, and if all other institutions become almost as unpopular as the zealots and are unable to keep order, then the public may acquiesce to religious rule, just as it did in Afghanistan, where the Taliban was also never popular except in comparison to abysmal alternatives. However Pakistan is much more urban than Afghanistan and I don't think we're anywhere near that outcome.
*Such a revolution is nuclear state is not something the world should be sanguine about, even if we think the long-term benefits to Pakistani society would out-weigh the short-term violence that a revolution would almost surely bring.
no subject
Date: 2009-02-16 04:53 pm (UTC)you make them out to be, and have many sympathizers in both 1) and 2).
That said, they are still a rather small minority.
(No hard data, just my feeling)
no subject
Date: 2009-02-16 05:04 pm (UTC)Pakistan on the edge
Date: 2009-02-16 05:28 pm (UTC)